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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 11-2688
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
MARCELLUS BARFIELD,
Appellant.
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 07-cr-00583)
District Judge: Honorable Legrome Davis
_____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 22, 2012
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: June 26, 2012 )

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
In this appeal, we are asked to consider the reasonableness of Marcellus Barfield’s
sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment for violation of his supervised release. For the
reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
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I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we set forth only the facts and
procedural history relevant to our conclusion.
On November 15, 2002, Marcellus Barfield pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
commit armed bank robbery, armed bank robbery, and using or carrying a firearm during
and in relation to a crime of violence. The District Court sentenced him to 72 months’
imprisonment, five years’ supervised release, and a $300 special assessment.
After serving the imprisonment portion of his sentence, Barfield began his first
term of supervised release on July 1, 2008. On December 17, 2008, his probation officer
filed a petition for revocation of supervised release, alleging that Barfield failed to appear
for scheduled appointments and drug tests, tested positive for drug use, failed to report
for counseling sessions, and failed to make restitution payments. App. 13-14. On
January 20, 2009, Barfield was arrested by the Delaware State Police for possession of
marijuana, criminal impersonation, driving without a driver’s license, and failure to have
a driver’s license. App. 17. These charges were added to an amended violation report
and submitted to the Court. When Barfield failed to appear for his hearing on February 3,
2009, the Court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. At the rescheduled revocation
hearing on November 30, 2009, the District Court revoked Barfield’s supervised release
and imposed a sentence of 10 months’ imprisonment to be followed by 36 months’
supervised release. It further ordered that Barfield serve the first six months of release in
a halfway house.
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Barfield’s second term of supervised release began on August 20, 2010 at the
Kintock Residential Re-Entry Facility. Despite orders to remain there for six months,
Barfield left the facility after only two days. App. 55. His probation officer filed another
violation petition, which was subsequently amended to include his failure to report for
scheduled appointments, notify his probation officer of a change in residence, and make
scheduled restitution payments. App. 58-59. Before a hearing was scheduled, Barfield
was arrested in Delaware County on December 2, 2010. He pleaded guilty to fleeing a
police officer, possession of a controlled substance, and driving with a suspended license.
He was sentenced by the state court to 5 to 23 months’ imprisonment. App. 68.
Upon completion of his state sentence, Barfield appeared at a second revocation
hearing on June 9, 2011. At the hearing, Barfield admitted to all five alleged violations.
The Guidelines range for Barfield’s offenses was 18 to 24 months, with a statutory
maximum of 50 months. After explaining that the trust it placed in Barfield at the first
revocation hearing was “not well-placed,” the District Court revoked his supervised
release and sentenced him to 36 months’ imprisonment. Barfield timely appealed.
II.
We review the District Court’s sentence for procedural and substantive
reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard.1 United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d
766, 769 (3d Cir. 2010). We must give due deference to the District Court’s judgment
because “[t]he sentencing judge has access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583(e).
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
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case and the individual defendant before him.” United States v. Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52
(2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Barfield bears the burden of showing unreasonableness. We will affirm the
sentence unless Barfield sufficiently establishes that “no reasonable sentencing court
would have imposed the same sentence on [him] for the reasons the district court
provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). This is
an extremely high bar. Even if we might reasonably have concluded that a different
sentence was appropriate, we may not supplant the District Court’s judgment with our
own. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and the District Court’s reasons for
sentencing Barfield above the Guidelines range, we conclude that his sentence is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable.2
As the record reflects, the District Court focused primarily on Barfield’s breach of
trust as the justification for the sentence it imposed. Barfield asserts that the Court’s
emphasis on breach of trust is inappropriate, but this Court has explained that “a district
court’s primary consideration in handing down a revocation sentence is the defendant’s
breach of trust.” United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006). Moreover,
while the District Court did emphasize Barfield’s breach of trust, it also considered the
other sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). For example, with respect to
deterrence, the Court explained that it had given Barfield multiple opportunities to
2

On appeal, Barfield does not assert a claim of procedural error. Nevertheless,
we have considered the procedural reasonableness of Barfield’s sentence, and conclude
that any such claim would be without merit.
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demonstrate better behaviors, but that he seemed either “unwilling or unable” to satisfy
the terms of supervised release. App. 112. The Court also considered Barfield’s personal
circumstances, but found that they failed to outweigh his “utter and complete lack of
effort.” Id. at 113. Indeed, the sentencing judge stated that Barfield “fundamentally
misunderst[ood] the nature of Court supervision of an offender” and had an “unwilling”
state of mind towards rehabilitation. Id. at 114.
Ultimately, the Court handed down a term of imprisonment of 36 months. This
sentence was 12 months higher than the top of the range, and 14 months lower than the
statutory maximum. As Barfield had demonstrated his inability to comply with
supervised release, the District Court decided to convert Barfield’s prior term of
supervised released into a term of imprisonment. It felt that this sentence was “sufficient,
but not greater than necessary” to meet the goals of sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and
we do not think that the District Court’s judgment was unreasonable.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District
Court.
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